For generations, Chinese fishermen have been living on the islands of Xisha, Dongsha and Nansha in the South China Sea. They are known in English as the Paracel Islands, the Pratas Islands, and the Spratly Islands. Two years ago, China established the city of Sansha to administer the islands and their surrounding waters, and one group benefiting from this is the fishermen there. Today in our special series “Looking South”, reporter Han Bin goes to Zhaoshu Island in the Xishas. He heads out on a boat with fishermen and finds out about their connection to the waters. Morning comes early in the South China Sea. This tiny Zhaoshu island is home to some 200 fishermen. Most have been here for generations. 46 year-old Chen Yihu learned the fishing skills from his father. Today, his 20-year-old son Chen Siyu follows in his footsteps. Almost every day, they go out to sea. Life is not easy, but they are committed to their trade ... and heritage. “We have to travel quite a far away from the coast, and to find a place where the tide is not too high for safety reasons,” Chen Yihu said. Siyu has many options in life, but he says he wants to work alongside his father -- and he’s proud of being a fisherman in the South China Sea. Diving gives him a special perspective. Over the past few years, he’s seen the numbers and varieties of sea snails and fish in coastal waters decline, so the fishermen have to sail further out. Still, father and son believe life is good. “I had been fishing in the Zhongsha and Nansha islands for many years before coming here to the Xisha Islands. And I decided to settle here as I found the water full of resources. We now can harvest some 20 kilograms of sea snails each day, earning some 200 yuan” Chen Yihu said. Rich in fishery resources, the South China Sea has been a traditional fishing ground of Chinese fishermen. And it’s part of a national strategy to boost China’s maritime power, by improving the marine economy with fishing. Sansha provides a place to test the water. Zhaoshu is one of the main islands of the Xisha Islands. No soldiers or police are stationed here, but many of the island’s fishermen have joined the militia to guard against any foreign illegal fishing activities. Like Chen Yihu, many fishermen have the bitter experience of being detained and having their property confiscated by Vietnamese authorities for fishing in some disputed waters. Zhaoshu’s population is overwhelmingly male, as the living conditions here are still harsh. Nighttime doesn’t mean the work stops. It’s also the time for calculating the day’s income and preparing for the next day. And the establishment of Sansha city has given them new hopes for a better life in the future. “The most inconvenient thing on the island is the shortage of drinking water and vegetables, as well as daily necessities. The new Sansha municipal government has promised to improve our living conditions. We are very grateful and looking forward to all the changes,” said Huang Lianghua, wife of Chen Yihu. For all the fishermen in Sansha, the establishment of the city means it will be easier to earn a living around the South China Sea. They will also be better protected in pursuing their trade. A sea of gold, with priceless treasures. It’s the only life they’ve ever known.

How about an airport? Military buildings! Even tennis courts! This is Pratas Island, the above-ground portion of a submerged atoll that forms an island group of the same name in English and known in Chinese as Dongsha Qundao (Tungsha Tao). Only Pratas/Dongsha is always above water; the other two islands forming the rest of the atoll, North and South Vereker, are submerged at high tide. Other than a short Japanese occupation during World War II, Pratas has been Chinese-controlled since at least the Han dynasty. Control over Pratas is currently held by the Republic of China, i.e. Taiwan, and thus is also claimed by the People’s Republic of China as part of its integral territory. The Pratas Islands are just one group out of the many small islands and shoals in the South China Sea disputed by various countries as they look to claim island groups in order gain access to the resources in the waters surrounding them. The largest and most famous of these groups are the Spratly Islands, which have six different governments jostling for jurisdiction over all or part of just 4 km2 of land area in order to gain control over 425 000 km2 of ocean and the accompanying fishing and petroleum exploitation rights. As the dispute over the Pratas Islands is between two governments claiming to be the governments of the same state, it represents a different type of dispute in which possession is just as important as a moral/military victory rather than an economic one (although the last one doesn’t hurt, either). 556px-South_China_Sea_map The various disputed islands of Southeast Asia.The Pratas Islands are to the north of the map. The Paracel Islands (held by the PRC, claimed by Vietnam and the ROC) lie to the southwest. Scarborough Reef (held by the Philippines, claimed by the PRC and ROC) lies to the southeast. The Spratly Islands are the large archipelago highlighted in the south end of the South China Sea, disputed between the PRC, ROC, Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei. Source: Yeu Ninje, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:South_China_Sea.jpg. Licensed under theCreative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Licence. At just 2.8 km long and 0.8 km wide, Pratas Island is nevertheless the largest island in the middle of the South China Sea, covered in sand, grass and scrub. The atoll is rich in coral and marine life. As with many of China’s offshore islands, Pratas was held by the ROC in the wake of the Chinese Revolution. Originally the islands were under military control, but today they legally exist as part of the city of Kaohsiung and serve as an outpost for the Taiwanese coast guard, guarding the southern entry point to the Taiwan Strait between Taiwan and mainland China as well as the western entry to the Bashi Channel between Taiwan and the Philippines. Pratas hosts an airport, military post office, hospital, library, temple and barracks along with a small power station to operate them. As well, there are sleeping quarters and supply services for fishermen in the region who visit during March and April, and three jetties have been built along the shore. In 1989, a stone monument was dedicated symbolically reasserting Taiwanese sovereignty (as well, the monument functions as a triangulation point for surveys). Most recently, the atoll was designated a marine national park in 2006 by Taiwan, another measure to ensure the island will not be touched by outsiders. Further Reading Central News Agency (2011). Taiwan asserts sovereignty over South China Sea islands. Want China Times, 18 April 2011. Available at http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1101&MainCatID;=11&id;=20110418000055. Accessed 24 April 2011. Guo R.(2007). Dongsha Qundao (Archipelago). Territorial Disputes and Resource Management: A Global Handbook, 99-100. New York: Nova Science Publishers. Hung, J. (2009). Sovereignty over the Spratly Islands. China Post, 22 June 2009. Available at http://www.chinapost.com.tw/commentary/the-china-post/joe-hung/2009/06/22/213223/p1/Sovereignty-over.htm. Accessed 24 April 2011. Pike, J. (2009). Pratas Island. Global Security, 20 April 2009. Available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/taiwan/pratas.htm. Accessed 24 April 2011. Posted in Geopolitics, Remote Places, Water Tagged atoll, China, Dongsha Qundao, island, Pacific Ocean, Pratas Islands, Pratas Reef, South China Sea, Taiwan, Tungsha Tao. Locations China, Taiwan. Bookmark the permalink.

A storm has been brewing for decades in the South China Sea, and it has nothing to do with the weather. Instead, it's a virtual typhoon of competing claims over tiny, uninhabited island chains that ring the South China Sea and reach even farther north. They all have one thing in common: China has claimed control of them. During a trip to Asia this week, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stepped into the middle of the latest row — this one between China and the Philippines over a small archipelago of wind- and wave-swept rocks and coral called the Scarborough Shoal (or the Huangyan Islands, as China prefers to call them). In the past month or so, China has literally roped off access to Scarborough by stretching a line across the horseshoe-shaped lagoon to prevent fishermen from the Philippines, located just 120 miles to the east, from entering. And this week, Japan announced it had struck a deal with private owners to buy the five Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, whose sovereignty China has never recognized. Beijing was quick to blast the move as "illegal and invalid." Enlarge this image Protesters in Manila, Philippines, marched toward the Chinese consulate during a May rally decrying the standoff between the two nations over the Scarborough Shoal. Pat Roque/AP Robert Kaplan, chief geopolitical analyst for Stratfor and author of the upcoming book The Revenge of Geography, says China's claims are rooted in economic and national prestige. "It's a historic belief that is very similar to that which motivated the United States in the Caribbean basin throughout much of the 19th and 20th centuries," he adds. Claims, Counterclaims And The 'Cow's Tongue' China sees the islands, and more broadly control over the adjacent seas, as a historical right, dovetailing with its newly reclaimed role of East Asia's dominant power. Also at stake: a strategic waterway with massive oil and gas reserves that potentially could help fuel China's energy-hungry industries and towns. Speaking in Indonesia ahead of her arrival in Beijing, Clinton reiterated the U.S. position that the various island disputes — which have put China at odds with nearly every one of its maritime neighbors — should be resolved "collaboratively ... without coercion, without intimidation, without threats and without the use of force." But coercion, intimidation, threats and even occasional violence have all been part of these disputes, many dating to the end of World War II. The claims and counterclaims can be confusing. It's China vs. the Philippines and Taiwan for control of Scarborough Shoal; Taiwan also claims the Pratas Islands and (along with Vietnam) the Paracel Islands and the Macclesfield Bank, which the Philippines also claims; the Spratly Islands are claimed by Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and even the tiny sultanate of Brunei. These disputes involve an area known as the "cow's tongue," which is roughly equivalent to the entire South China Sea. Farther north, Beijing and Tokyo are at loggerheads over the Senkaku, or Diaoyu Islands, as the Chinese call them. Twice in the past 40 years, gunfire has been exchanged between naval forces of China and Vietnam over the Spratly and Paracel islands, where China has set up a military outpost. Last month, a ship full of activists from Hong Kong arrived at the Senkaku islands with the intent of occupying them, but they were rebuffed by the Japanese Coast Guard. In a similarly provocative move, a group of lawmakers from Taipei traveled to the Spratly archipelago this week to observe Taiwan's coast guard conduct a live-fire exercise. Resetting The Regional Pecking Order "I think what makes this situation particularly intractable is that China's economic and strategic interests broadly coincide in the South China Sea," says John Ciorciari, a professor who specializes in international affairs at the University of Michigan's Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy. The economic interests could be enormous. Estimates vary wildly, but one Chinese study has put the potential oil reserves in the South China Sea at 213 billion barrels — roughly 80 percent of Saudi Arabia's known reserves. The natural gas reserves in the region are said to be five times those of the U.S. But strategic interests and simple nationalism play an equally important role in the various disputes. China sees itself as the dominant power in the region, much the same way that the United States has been the de facto leader of the Western Hemisphere, a role that Washington codified in the Monroe Doctrine, first espoused by President James Monroe in 1823. From Beijing's perspective, "this is part of China's natural sphere of influence and has been for thousands of years," says Christopher Johnson, the head of China studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. "It was only the aberration of the last 150 years or so — the so-called period of humiliation — that caused that to change," he says. "Now, China wants to reset to what it sees as the natural pecking order and balance in the region." That reset could take time, and although Beijing is not averse to some aggressive muscle-flexing, it can afford to wait, Ciorciari says. "I think China's interest is at a maximum winning in these disputes and at a minimum forestalling defeat," he says. "Because China and its neighbors expect that [Beijing] is going to have more power relative to its neighbors in the future, China ... is happy to defer resolution of the issue until a date when it has the ability to resolve it on more favorable terms." Kaplan, the Stratfor analyst, agrees: "These islands have become the focus of media attention because all of these countries for the first time, really, are able to project naval power beyond their own landmasses into the sea." Enlarge this image U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton meets with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi on Tuesday in Beijing to press for a peaceful resolution to competing territorial claims in the South China Sea. Feng Li/AP "In the '50s, '60s and early '70s, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and China were all deeply involved internally — with internal civil wars or rebellions, or the Cultural Revolution in China's case. It's only in the past decade or so that there's been sufficient national consolidation so that they can project power outward." But Beijing is suspicious of Washington's role as the military benefactor for many of the nations that have a stake in the outcome of the region-wide islands dispute. The U.S. has strong military ties with Japan, the Philippines and China's archnemesis, Taiwan. It also enjoys good relations with Malaysia and a gradually warming relationship with Vietnam. China also questions Washington's claim of neutrality. Earlier this week, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesman said, essentially, Beijing has heard it all before. "I hope [the U.S.] will keep its promise and do more to help stability and not the opposite," Hong Lei said. Besides keeping a wary eye on Chinese ambitions, the U.S. has an interest in making sure international maritime access to the region goes unimpeded, something China has also insisted it is committed to doing. Gulliver And The Lilliputians No one expects any of the island disputes to break out into a shooting war anytime soon. Instead, the issue is likely to remain on the backburner for now, "a bronze medalist in the news behind whatever goes on in the greater Middle East and the European debt crisis," as Kaplan puts it. Ciorciari likens the standoff between China and the various regional claimants to Gulliver and the Lilliputians. The Lilliputians, he says, "need some time to tie China into a set of relationships that they hope will give them at least the chance of sharing the [oil and gas] proceeds through joint arrangements rather than have China exercise control over the whole of the South China Sea." But the Lilliputians also cannot afford to cede ground. For them, as much as China, it's a question of national sovereignty. Besides the potential for oil and gas revenues, there's also the more immediate concern over fishing rights. Even so, the bluster on all sides over these barren pieces of rock always has the potential to grow from a Cold War-style standoff to one that could go hot, says Johnson. "All it takes is the actions of a couple of cowboys," he says. "The building nationalism on all sides in this dispute means that the actions of local ship captains or maritime surveillance forces could easily upset the balance and suddenly handcuff their respective national leaderships."